Introduction
Until the early nineteenth century, the slave trade to Cuba was carried out to a large extent by European and American firms and individuals. The abolition of the slave trade in the British colonies and the subsequent policing of the Atlantic from 1808 by the British navy had a profound effect on the slave traders and their modus operandi. These changes in the Atlantic basin led Cuban-based entrepreneurs to get directly involved in the transatlantic slave trade.
This involvement often came in the form of trade partnerships and the creation of new firms, and was neither easy nor straightforward. This article first examines the operational changes implemented by these Cuban-based entrepreneurs, subsequently focusing on the innovative strategies instigated by them, particularly from the 1830s onwards. Entrepreneurship is defined here as a vital function of economic agents who Ôspecialize in collecting information that permits them to make judgmental decisions about innovation.Õ 1 This view recognizes the volatile character of market environments, which constantly produce new business opportunities while simultaneously rendering some previous models obsolete. 2 In environments like these, entrepreneurs as the ones at the center of this study, make decisions about innovation strategies, and exploit the most promising of these new opportunities. 3 Finally, this article argues that it was thanks to the flexibility in their operations, and to their innovative strategies, that Cuban-based entrepreneurs were able to make enormous profits until the very end of the epoch of transatlantic slave trade.
The success of the Cuban-based firms and individuals in the slave trade business during the illegal period was of pivotal importance for the economic growth of Cuba at the time, and it coincided with the rise of the Second Slavery period. 4 Sugar was one of the most demanded trading products in international markets at the time. Based on increasingly larger annual imports of African slaves Cuba became, during the first half of the nineteenth century, the main producer and exporter of sugar at international level. 5 Ultimately, Cuban-based merchants and planters saw the continuation of the slave trade as a sine qua non condition for the survival of their business and the economic prosperity of the island. To keep up with the international marketsÕ demands, they did not hesitate in investing heavily in what was by all standards a bourgeoning criminal activity, the transatlantic slave trade.
To date, no systematic archival research exists which addresses the question of how these Cuban-based merchants and planters, without any knowledge and capabilities of the slave trade, managed to catch-up with their European and Brazilian competitors and to overcome the difficulties associated with the illegal nature of the trade, in order to then dominate it. 6 This article builds on archival research carried out in Cuba, Spain, Brazil and Great Britain. It also incorporates theoretical insights from the economics of innovation, entrepreneurship, and diversification literatures to prove that it was due to the creation of a large network of agents, the adoption of diversification and risk-management strategies, and the introduction of technological innovations that Cuban-based firms were able to increase their flexibility, to overcome their lack of know-how, and to be successful in this trade, all this in spite of the illegal character of the transatlantic slave trade in the Spanish Atlantic after 1820.
Although the involvement of Cuban-based firms and individuals in the slave trade was, first and foremost a criminal activity, in this article they are studied as business endeavors, as this approach better reflects their character and nature, and also allows for a more in-depth analysis of their impact. This article avoids taking a moral perspective, but acknowledges that the people and activities presented and discussed in the following pages developed a heinous business that had a deep impact on the societies where they procured their slaves, and on the lives of those men, women, and children they carried out across the Atlantic to satisfy their needs for free labor.
Adapting to changing market conditions: the rise of Cuban-based firms
Until the early 1790s the Cuban slave trade was in the hands of foreign traders, companies, and occasionally governments. The Spanish policy of granting monopolistic privileges to these foreign traders and conglomerates was effective enough to supply Cuban cities and countryside with sufficient numbers of African slaves, until the revolution in the neighboring Although the proposal for the creation of this African Company was a complete failure, most of those who had bought actions in it were still able to become leading slave merchants in the years to come. For example, the firm of Cuesta Manzanal & Brother continued to import Africans to Cuba until at least the late 1830s, and the Gonz ‡lez Larrinaga family did something similar. Their fortunes were eventually merged when both families were linked through a marriage in the early part of the century. 12 Their connections to another key slave trading family, the PŽrez de Urria, were strengthened in the 1830s, also through marriage. 13 Others would soon join them, and among these emerging new firms and individuals were some of the most notorious Atlantic slave traders of the nineteenth century, including Pedro For•ade, the Zangroniz brothers, Pedro Blanco, and Joaqu'n G-mez.
14 Even before 1803, Cuban-based entrepreneurs, including some of those mentioned above, had began to retrieve the actual trade from foreign hands. 15 Operational changes in the characteristics of the slave trade from 1820 onwards
The new environment that was created as a result of British abolitionist pressures across the Atlantic basin constituted the first major challenge to these newly formed Cuban-based firms. 21 Reducing the risks associated with the slave trade required learning the ropes of a new business, which implied Ð in the first instance Ð acquiring the know-how of the trade so as to reduce the increased risks. 22 Very dissimilar but intensely interconnected issues and abilities had to be learned and honed at a fast pace. Among them were what provisions were needed for the transatlantic voyage and where they could be found, how the actual operations and negotiations in the coast of Africa were to be conducted, and what items of trade were more likely to be accepted by the slave suppliers there, etc. 23 Since they had been unable to open offices in London or Liverpool as they had originally planned, their access to financial and trade-related know-how was restricted.
Furthermore, and in spite of the increasing complications that the illegal trade brought to their businesses, competition and cooperation intensified as the profits to be made still attracted a considerable number of foreign traders into this commerce.
Simultaneously the main characteristics of the slave trade were significantly modified at various points after 1820, and particularly after 1835. Slave traders changed their modus operandi as they had to adapt to the new illicit character of the business. Specifically, while before they traded in open day light and had the necessary time to ensure that their human cargo was in perfect physical condition, now they were forced to implement their trafficking operations whilst often finding ways of hiding away from the anti-slave trade patrols. In Africa, slave factories that were previously open for all to be found with ease were soon moved into the interior. These measures were taken virtually everywhere from the Upper Guinea coast to Angola, in order to avoid being seen by the anti-slave trade patrols. In the cases of the Upper Guinea coast (rivers Pongo, Gallinas, Sestos, etc.), slave-trading agents had their factories inland by these rivers, where the British were often unable to reach them.
The same happened in the river Congo, where the river port of Boma (or as it was often referred to, Embomma) gained importance after the British began patrolling of the area in the late 1810s.
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The newly formed firms learned rapidly how to operate in this business and how to adjust to change by employing a trial-and-error method. A typical example of acquisition of know-how during this period was given by Theodore Canot, a minor but well-known slave trader who was active in the 1820s and 1830s. In his first journey to Upper Guinea, just before establishing himself there as an agent for Cuban-and Puerto Rican-based merchants, Canot found how terribly mistaken he had been by carrying a large cargo of Ôuseless tobaccoÕ from Havana as a bartering item to trade for slaves. 25 As a matter of fact, Canot described his adventure in trying to turn his cargo into any sort of item that could be traded for slaves along the coast. Eventually, he was forced to rely on an English businessman who sent his tobacco to Freetown where a ÔHebrew friendÕ graciously exchanged it for Manchester fabrics, which were readily accepted by those trading human beings at River Pongo. 26 Conducting business in Africa depended to a large extent on having contacts with local rulers and veteran slave trade agents, but after the mid-1810s was contingent on the abilities of agents and slave shipmasters to avoid falling into the hands of British patrols.
These new circumstances led ship owners to instruct the men they put in charge of the transatlantic voyages to follow strict operational routines in order to avoid being spotted and captured by anti-slave trade cruisers. 27 These operational routines were so astute that by 1843
the Mixed Commission judges in Havana wrote to the Earl of Aberdeen noting that these activities were almost impossible to track down. In their own words there was Ôso much mystery, and so many devices adopted to cover their designs, that it is impossible for us to learn sufficiently of their proceedings, to enable us satisfactorily to report them.Õ
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After the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1835 was signed, using foreign flags belonging to countries with which the British had not signed common abolition treaties was another efficient way to avoid capture. Notable among those were the American flag, and for a while in the late 1830s the Portuguese flag. The use of these flags was frequently supported by the American and Portuguese consuls in Havana, Salvador de Bahia, Lisbon, C ‡diz, and other ports where the ships could obtain legal papers to undertake their journeys to Africa. The American consul in Havana, Nicholas P. Trist, was heavily involved in this sort of murky deal especially after 1835, to the point that the US Government was forced to open an enquiry into his actions in Cuba, after a number of American vessel captains met in New York in August 1839 to discuss his inadmissible behavior, and in particular his involvement in the slave trade. 29 Even more notorious was the support lent to the slave trade by the Portuguese consul in Havana, JosŽ Miguel Fern ‡ndez who was himself considered to be one of the most prominent slave traders in the port before his appointment in the mid-1830s. 30 In addition to this cunning new modus operandi, Cuban-based entrepreneurs were quite successful at liaising with the Spanish authorities, who more often than not rushed to cover up their tracks and received substantial cuts from the profits as a reward. One of the Cuban governors of the period, Francisco Dionisio Vives (1823-32) stated in unequivocal terms that he had and would always protect the slave traders, because it was thanks to them that the prosperity of the island, based on the production of sugar and coffee, was possible.
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Another governor of this period, Miguel Tac-n (1834-38) commented years after leaving his post that after 1835 the traffic rather than diminishing, as the British had expected, increased, thanks to the protection that the authorities, including himself, had offered to the slave trading entrepreneurs based on the Cuban capital. while he had refused to take any bribes from the traders, his predecessors had traditionally accepted around two hundred doubloons per every landed cargo in the previous decades. 33 Kennedy and Dalrymple also insisted that although ValdŽs had refused these bribes, minor officers across the island continued to accept payoffs of at least one hundred doubloons per landed cargo. 34 Even as late as in 1859, British consul and Mixed Commission judge Joseph T. Crawford was forced to denounce what he referred to as Ôthe most glaring corruption of the local authoritiesÕ in relation to the many illegal fittings and landing of slave trade expeditions in the island under the neglectful eyes of the islandÕs authorities. 35 Overall, the end of the legal slave trade constituted a unique opportunity for Cubanbased entrepreneurs to enter this profitable business. However, these newly formed firms were faced with two fundamental challenges: (1) they had to acquire the relevant knowledge and know-how, which was often tacit and protected through secrecy due to the illegal nature of the trade; and (2) they had to rapidly adapt their modus operandi so as to maneuver under the new obstacles imposed by the illegal nature of the trade.
Cuban-based firmsÕ strategies
In addition to the operational changes discussed above, Cuban-based firms were entrepreneurial as they were able to exploit the new opportunities arising from the volatility underlines Ôits value to the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost.Õ 40 This is applicable to the use of independent agents by slave traders during the illegal period. As the risk for these agents increased considerably due to the persecution and prosecution of slave traders, their incentives to behave opportunistically increased as well. In particular, after 1820 transactions between unaffiliated agents and Cuban-based slave traders began to decline, as once the agents would reveal vital information about the location or availability of slaves they held, the value of that information would decline as well as the willingness of the slave trader to pay for it.
Cuban-based firms overcame the above problems by internalizing the market and creating an extensive and complex network of their own agents whenever and wherever Havana, and former slave vessel captain, Jacinto Llobet.
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The operations described in this article are but a fraction of a very complex history of entrepreneurial strategies adopted by Cuban-based slave trading firms in the nineteenth century. Once they were able to dispense with former agents and put their own personnel in place, the efficiency of their operations, and by extension their profits, increased significantly, to the point that some of them like Pedro Blanco and Lino Carballo, JosŽ Mazorra, Joaqu'n G-mez, and various members of the Zulueta clan eventually became substantially rich individuals. However, the risk of losing all this wealth was never too far away, as the well-documented case of Blanco & Carballo, whose firm went bankrupt in 1848, demonstrates.
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The strategies of the Cuban-based entrepreneurs, when it came to establishing networks of agents did not always follow similar paths. Some of them, notoriously those of 
(b) Diversification and Risk-Management Stratagems
From the very early years of direct Cuban involvement in the slave trade, a phenomenon that was clearly observable was that of the diversification of business operations. This was a process that at least at the beginning went both ways, consequently fueling the rise of the Second Slavery in the island. At that time some important foreign slave traders bought lands, often already established plantations, in the Cuban countryside, while Cuban and Spanish plantation owners invested for the first time in the now promising business of the slave trade.
Diversification may sometimes be inspired by the benefits resulting from economies of scope, which arise when fixed capital is indivisible. 57 In the case of the slave trade, the cost of any given voyage was fixed, as it was independent of the quantity of slaves that would be transported. As the quantity of slaves varied greatly due to the increased uncertainties associated with the unlawful nature of the trade, diversification was a strategy that many
Cuban-based entrepreneurs pursued so as to reduce risk. Specifically, Cuban-based firms diversified in trading other products such as palm oil, ivory, hides, and salt. Additionally, they also diversified by investing in human trafficking of Spanish migrants, free laborers from Africa, and Chinese indentured workers, or by resorting to acts of piracy. Equally, they resorted to risk-management strategies such as part-ownership ventures and expansion in the number of partners, which allowed them to disperse their investment in the slave trade across many different vessels in any given year. 62 Whilst in the late eighteenth century it had been common for merchants, notably London-based Atlantic merchants, to form partnerships with two or three individuals, due to the increased risks associated with the illegal nature of the post-1820 slave trade, Cuban-based entrepreneurs usually established partnerships with up to twenty or more partners. 63 To some extent, their behavior echoed that of the Liverpool merchants in the last years of the legal slave trade, who also endeavored to expand their partnerships, although to a smaller number than Cuban-based entrepreneurs, so as to reduce risks. 64 At the time, many of these business partnerships were open-ended and informal, so that any merchant could be a partner in various different ventures.
In Cuba, these part-ownership ventures had proliferated to such an extent already in the early 1830s, that British officers based in Havana were forced to mention and discuss A clever Captain well known in the Traffic unites with two or three friends to commence an expedition, a ship is bought, her cargo is prepared, meanwhile the number of the interested is increasing and at last, when all is ready there may prove to be twenty partners, some having shares of eight or ten thousand dollars and others of only one thousand dollars. existing agents based in Manila and Xiamen, but by the mid-1850s they had replaced them with their own men; a circumstance that allowed them to make even larger profits.
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Equally and almost simultaneously, in the 1850s Cuban-based slave traders saw an opportunity in importing colonists from neighboring Yucat ‡n. Many of the leading slavers of the time, including Domingo Goicur'a and the Zangroniz brothers, agreed trading contracts with Mexican authorities that went as far as to allow for the import of not only willing laborers but also war prisoners from the Caste Wars that were underway in the Yucat ‡n peninsula at the time. 73 Above all, however, slave traders diversified by continuing their investments in sugar, as they had done since the 1790s. 74 Already in the mid-nineteenth century many of them had purchased their own sugar plantations. By then Pedro For•ade owned the Porvenir sugar plantation near the town of Col-n; Salvador Martiartu owned the Achuri and the Arratia estates; and the Zulueta clan, now blended with another leading slave trading family, the Sam ‡, owned several of the largest and most technologically innovative sugar plantations not only in Cuba, but in the world. Renowned among them were the çlava, the Espa-a, and the Vizcaya. 75 By diversifying in so many ways, many of these leading slave trading firms and individuals were also able to survive the end of the slave trade and to consolidate their fortunes by expanding their businesses across the Atlantic world.
(c) Introduction of Technological Innovations
By the 1840s the pursuing of slave traders by the Royal Navy in Africa, the Atlantic, and the Caribbean meant that the slave trade had become an increasingly risky commerce. While many slave traders, like the firms of Busto & Incl ‡n, and Blanco & Carballo had gone out of business, those that still managed to carry on with the traffic had to change their strategies yet again. 76 To all the stratagems discussed previously in this article, from the early 1830s to the late 1840s, a new one, based on new technological advances related to shipbuilding was added. According to Schumpeter, shocks give rise to disequilibrium in the markets.
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Entrepreneurs who exploit these discontinuities through technological innovation destroy the competitive advantage of existing firms and prosper. This creative destruction rather than price competition was a prevalent force in the slave trade after 1820.
From the late 1820s, US-built vessels became extremely popular among Cuban-based slave traders. 78 While large heavily armed ships continued to be used, new small fast-sailing vessels were in high demand. 79 The other main characteristic of these Baltimore-built clippers was speed. In order to build tailor-made ships for the slave trade, such as the ones requested by the Cuban-based entrepreneurs, a number of modifications were made to these new vessels. Chief among them was the aforementioned lowering of the height of their topsails, as well as a redistribution of the weight towards the front of the ship. Weapons were dispensed of, since now slave trade captains would rely mostly on speed and camouflage to avoid anti-slave trade cruisers. These vessels were built to last only three or four voyages, a circumstance that allowed their owners to sacrifice them on occasion without incurring massive losses. 86 It is little wonder that the British Mixed Commission judges in Havana commented on multiple occasions that these vessels were Ôadmirably adapted for escaping from and deceiving His MajestyÕs cruizers
Another alteration that allowed for the construction and use of smaller ships in the transatlantic slave trade was the optimization of the space existing to hold the slaves after their purchase had taken effect in Africa. Portable coppers, irons, etc., became customary, allowing the slavers, who were constantly ready to escape and deceive, to throw all compromising items overboard in the event of being discovered and captured, allowing for a faster escape. Equally, not having heavy weaponry on board had a similar effect whenever they were chased by anti-slave trade cruisers. All in all, the adoption of state-of-the-art technologies gave Cuban-based slave traders an indisputable advantage, not only over those who were not able to adapt and compete, but also with respect to the success of their ultimate raison dÕetre, that of carrying as many men, women, and children across the Atlantic as they possibly could.
Eventually, in what was another moment of adaptation in the early 1850s, after the introduction of steamers, slave traders began using larger merchant vessels, which allowed them to carry much larger numbers of African slaves per voyage. 88 Although the British Navy eventually also introduced a number of steamers to patrol the waters of the island of Cuba, these steamers were frequently in need of repair and spent long periods in the arsenal of Havana, a circumstance that did not escape the eyes and ears of Havana-based slave traders, whose investments grew larger and larger during these years. 89 By the end of the decade, all British patrolling of the Cuban coastline was de facto terminated, further encouraging the fitting of large vessels and the chances of success of these large slave-trading expeditions.
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Conclusions
This article has brought to light a series of important aspects related to the adaptation to changing market conditions and their relationship with the emerging modern capitalism in the nineteenth-century Atlantic World, by examining the operational changes and innovative strategies introduced by Cuban-based entrepreneurs involved in the transatlantic slave trade.
It has highlighted that it was mainly due to the decisions and capabilities of these entrepreneurs to adapt and innovate in a riskier and volatile business environment that they were able to gain a competitive advantage in the slave trade across the Atlantic. This, in turn, served the booming of the Cuban sugar industry, and contributed to the perpetuation of the inhuman trafficking and bondage of African men, women and children for several decades.
Our most significant findings point to the fact that to do so, the Cuban-based firms internalized networks of agents in the Atlantic, as well as through diversification, riskmanagement, and technological innovation. It was precisely due to the combination of these entrepreneurial endeavors that capture rates of slave vessels remained about the same after 1835 as they had been before, extending the calamitous transatlantic slave trade for another generation. 91 
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38 Richardson, ed., Bristol, Africa, vol. 4, and Thomas, The Slave Trade, 694; and Law, Ouidah, slave tradersÕ new diversification strategies related mostly to the type and quality of merchandise they were able to deal in, and according to the times, to the changes on patterns of human trafficking that from the 1840s involved Chinese and Meso-American indentured workers.
